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SPORTING CHANCE: LITIGATING SEXISM
OUT OF THE OLYMPIC INTERSEX POLICY
Samantha Glazer
INTRODUCTION
On April 5, 2011, the International Olympic Committee
(“IOC”), the “supreme authority of the Olympic [m]ovement,”1
released a statement on the need to promulgate a clear set of
rules governing the inclusion of intersex2 athletes in time for the
2012 Summer Olympic Games in London.3 The IOC’s Executive
Board (“EB”) met for two days in London to discuss the issue
of the eligibility of female athletes with hyperandrogenism,4 a
condition where a woman possesses elevated androgen levels—
typically involving increased amounts of testosterone.5 The
resulting principles, a product of two separate meetings in 2010
J.D., Brooklyn Law School 2013, B.A., Wake Forest University, 2010. I
would like to thank my mother for her constant support and thoughtful
critiques during the process of writing this Note. Special thanks to Karen
Schneiderman for her help in selecting such an engaging subject and to the
entire staff of the Journal of Law and Policy for their tireless edits and
assistance.
1
The IOC: The Organisation, OLYMPIC.ORG, http://www.olympic.org/
about-ioc-institution (last visited Feb. 17, 2012).
2
“Intersex refers to the atypical appearance of the external genitalia at
birth where they differ from the usual development of either sex and create
difficulty in sex assignment.” Robert Ritchie et al., Intersex and the Olympic
Games, 101 J. ROYAL SOC. MED. 395, 395 (2008). For a more complete
discussion of intersex, see infra Part I.B.
3
IOC Addresses Eligibility of Female Athletes with Hyperandrogenism,
OLYMPIC.ORG (Apr. 5, 2011), http://www.olympic.org/about-ioc-institution?
articleid=124006.
4
Id.
5
Stephen Franks, Medical Progress: Polycystic Ovary Syndrome, 333
NEW ENG. J. MED. 853, 853 (1995).
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of the IOC Medical Commission and International Association of
Athletic Federations (“IAAF”)6 and adopted by the IAAF,
constitute the most recent attempt to regulate intersex athlete
participation in the Games.7 The IOC’s guidelines may be clear
cut, but they have a discriminatory effect on female athletes.
The IAAF first introduced a means for determining an
athlete’s sex in 1966.8 Since then, there have been several
iterations of sex tests developed by the IOC and IAAF.9 Scholars
have noted that traditionally, sex testing within the realm of the
Olympics has been justified on two grounds: (1) “sex exists in a
binary” and (2) “fairness in sport requires a strict separation of
the sexes.”10 These premises, however, reflect a flawed
understanding of sex and competitive advantage, respectively.11
While “sex verification supposes that every athlete can be
assigned to one of two sex categories,” scientifically, “[s]ex
cannot be distilled to a single determinable factor” that
conclusively indicates man or woman.12 Moreover, though the
notion of fairness in sport is well intentioned, sex verification is
an incomplete remedy for equality in competition because factors
aside from sex contribute to an athlete’s competitive advantage.13
Despite its faulty logic, sex testing continues to be a focus of
6

The IAAF is the International Sports Federation (“IF”) that governs the
worldwide administration of track and field events, referred to as “athletics.”
International Sports Federations, OLYMPIC.ORG, http://www.olympic.org/
content/The-IOC/Governance/International-Federations/ (last visited Feb. 17,
2012); International Association of Athletics Federations, OLYMPIC.ORG,
http://www.olympic.org/iaaf-athletics-road (last visited Feb. 17, 2012). For
further discussion of the relationship between the IOC and IFs, see infra Part
II.A.
7
IOC Addresses Eligibility of Female Athletes with Hyperandrogenism,
supra note 3.
8
Anna Peterson, But She Doesn’t Run Like a Girl . . .: The Ethic of
Fair Play and the Flexibility of the Binary Conception of Sex, 19 TUL. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 315, 320 (2010).
9
See infra Part II.B.
10
Erin Buzuvis, Caster Semenya and the Myth of a Level Playing Field,
MOD. AM., Fall 2010, at 36, 36.
11
See generally id.
12
Id. at 37–38.
13
Id. at 38.
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sports governing bodies.14 As the tradition of sex testing persists,
it is critical to recognize that its effects remain predominantly an
issue for female athletes.15 Even the IOC’s most recent
guidelines reflect an understanding that female, not male,
athletes will be held to arbitrary standards of acceptable
androgen levels.16
This Note asserts that the IOC’s guiding principles for
regulating
the
inclusion
of
female
athletes
with
hyperandrogenism result in discriminatory policies against
women. In Part I, this Note discusses the terms “sex,”
“gender,” and “intersex.” Part II will explain the internal
governance structure of the Olympic movement, including the
relationship between the IOC and IAAF, as well as detail the
various forms of sex testing used throughout history in sporting
events by both organizations. Part II will also describe the recent
sex testing guidelines developed by the IOC and IAAF. After
outlining the history of sex testing in sports and identifying the
current sex verification policy at issue in this Note, Part III will
transition to a discussion of two separate sex discrimination suits
brought by female athletes against Olympic governing bodies.17
In light of the case law discussed in Part III, Part IV will assess
the viability of a sex discrimination suit as a response to the IOC
and IAAF’s inequitable policy on hyperandrogenism. Ultimately,
this Note maintains that the current IOC and IAAF policy on
hyperandrogenism facially discriminates against women and that
litigation represents a viable vehicle for female athletes to voice
their opposition.

14

Joanna Marchant, Women with High Male Hormone Levels Face Sport
Ban, NATURE.COM (Apr. 14, 2011), http://www.nature.com/news/2011/
110414/full/news.2011.237.html.
15
Shan Kohli, London 2012: IOC’s New Rules for Transgender Athletes
Are Sexist, SPORTS LAW. (May 20, 2011), http://sportslawyer.in/london2012-ioc’s-new-rules-for-transgender-athletes-are-sexist.
16
Id.
17
Martin v. Int’l Olympics Comm., 740 F.2d 670, 673 (9th Cir. 1984);
Sagen v. Vancouver Org. Comm. for the 2010 Olympic & Paralympic
Winter Games (2009), 98 B.C.L.R. 4th 109, para. 1 (Can. B.C.).
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I. INTERSEXUALITY AND THE SEX-GENDER DISTINCTION
A. Sex and Gender: What’s the Difference?
Though colloquially the terms “sex” and “gender” are used
interchangeably, this Note assumes a distinction between them,
as is common practice in scholarly work examining the
participation of intersex or transgender athletes in sports.18 Sex is
a biological determination at birth19 and is generally defined
according to one’s genitals, gonads, chromosomes, and
hormones.20 While “[s]ex is about what your body includes[,]
‘[g]ender,’ by contrast is about who you are.”21 Gender is
dictated by self-perceptions about one’s identity22 and is
understood by scholars as a “social construct.”23 Gender is
related to sex in that it “refers to the social, cultural, or
attitudinal qualities that are typically associated with a particular
sex.”24 Simply, sex is a biological designation and gender is a
personal and/or societal designation.25
While one’s sex determines whether one is male or female,
gender is determinative of masculinity or femininity.26 Though
18

See Jessica L. Adair, In a League of Their Own: The Case for Intersex
Athletes, 18 SPORTS LAW. J. 121, 124 (2011); Emily J. Cooper, Gender
Testing in Athletic Competitions–Human Rights Violations: Why Michael
Phelps is Praised and Caster Semenya is Chastised, 14 J. GENDER RACE &
JUST. 233, 237–38 (2010); Alice Dreger, Sex Typing for Sport, 40 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 22, 22 (2010); Seema Patel, Transsexuals in Sport:
Inclusiveness and the Level Playing Field 2, available at
http://www.anglia.ac.uk/ruskin/en/home/faculties/alss/deps/law/research/pape
rs_in_law_series.Maincontent.0004.file.tmp/Transsexuals%20in%20sport.pdf.
19
Cooper, supra note 18, at 236; see also Patel, supra note 18.
20
See SHARON E. PREVES, INTERSEX AND IDENTITY: THE CONTESTED
SELF 26 (2003).
21
Dreger, supra note 18, at 22.
22
Id.
23
Cooper, supra note 18, at 237.
24
Id.
25
Id. at 236–37.
26
Adair, supra note 18, at 124; Patel, supra note 18. Justice Scalia, in a
dissenting opinion, discussed distinctions between sex and gender, noting
that, “[t]he word ‘gender’ has acquired the new and useful connotation of
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for many people being biologically male is linked to masculinity
or being biologically female is linked to femininity,27 some
individuals view themselves as masculine while simultaneously
possessing biologically female characteristics or as feminine
while possessing male characteristics.28 Recognizing the potential
for and existence of masculine females and feminine males, the
terms “sex” and “gender” will be used throughout this Note to
refer to distinct concepts.

cultural or attitudinal characteristics (as opposed to physical characteristics)
distinctive to the sexes. That is to say, gender is to sex as feminine is to
female and masculine to male.” J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S.
127, 157 n.1 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
27
Cooper, supra note 18, at 238.
28
See Dreger, supra note 18. In her article, The Five Sexes, Revisited,
Anne Fausto-Sterling, a Brown University professor and biologist, argues that
there are at least five sexes that should be recognized as “points in a
multidimensional space.” Anne Fausto-Sterling, The Five Sexes, Revisited, 40
SCIENCES 18, 23 (2000) (explaining her theory on variation in sex); see also
Haley K. Olsen-Acre, The Use of Drug Testing to Police Sex and Gender in
the Olympic Games, 13 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 207, 214 (2007) (discussing
Anne Fausto-Sterling’s work). In addition to “male” and “female,” FaustoSterling proposes the recognition of “‘herms’ (named after true
hermaphrodites, people born with both a testis and an ovary); ‘merms’ (male
pseudohermaphrodites, who are born with testes and some aspect of female
genitalia); and ‘ferms’ (female pseudohermaphrodites, who have ovaries
combined with some aspect of male genetalia).” Fausto-Sterling, supra, at
19.
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B. Defining Intersexuality29
Individuals whose sex and gender identities do not align are
collectively referred to as intersexuals.30 There are a “myriad of
conditions”31 that comprise intersexuality, which the
International Intersex Consensus Conference has termed
Disorder(s) of Sex Development (“DSD”).32
Intersexuality is, perhaps surprisingly, “a relatively common
occurrence . . . it is estimated that approximately 1 in 2000
children are born with ambiguous genitalia.”33 Current scientific
standards deem any child with an “adequate” penis to be male.34
“An ‘adequate’ penis is defined as ‘a penis capable of vaginal
penetration and urination while standing.’”35 This classification
presents an overly simplistic view of sex and highlights society’s
general understanding of sex as binary.36 From birth, individuals
29

In addition to appreciating the difference between “sex” and “gender,”
it is critical to realize another distinction, intersex from transsexual. While
legal commentary on sex testing in sports frequently discusses the treatment
of both transsexual and intersex individuals, these terms refer to different
scientific and biological conditions. Transsexualism references “[t]he desire to
change anatomic sexual characteristics to conform physically with one’s
perception of oneself as a member of the opposite sex, coupled with a desire
to live full-time in the role of the opposite sex.” STEDMAN’S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 415,630 (27th ed. 2000). Intersexuals, meanwhile, are “people
who, as individuals, are born with genetic, hormonal and physical features
that may be thought to be typical of both male and female at once.” What is
Intersex?, ORGANISATION INTERSEX INT’L USA, http://oiiusa.org/what_
is_intersex (last visited Feb. 17, 2012). This note will focus on policies
governing the inclusion of intersex athletes.
30
Megan Bell, Transsexuals and the Law, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1709,
1718 (2004).
31
Ritchie et al., supra note 2.
32
Id.
33
Peterson, supra note 8, at 319.
34
Maura Kelly, Intersex: Sociologists for Women in Society Fact Sheet 1
(2007),
available
at
https://www.socwomen.org/web/images/stories/
resources/fact_sheets/fact_03-2007-intersex.pdf.
35
Id.
36
Adair, supra note 18, at 124. “In a world that tends to classify a
person with either a male sex and gender or a female sex and gender,
intersexuality can present problems immediately at birth.” Id.
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are classified as either male or female.37 Rejecting this
“either/or”38 designation, Anne Fausto-Sterling argues that sex
exists on a spectrum, or as points in space.39 Sex is more fully
defined by the following eight factors:
1. Genetic or chromosomal sex—XY or XX;
2. Gonadal sex (reproductive sex glands)—testes or
ovaries;
3. Internal morphologic sex (determined after three
months gestation)—seminal vesicles/prostrate [sic] or
vagina/uterus/fallopian tubes;
4. External morphologic sex (genitalia)—penis/scrotum or
clitoris/labia;
5. Hormonal sex—androgens or estrogens
6. Phenotypic sex (secondary sexual features)—facial and
chest hair or breasts
7. Assigned sex and gender rearing; and
8. Sexual identity.40
These factors frequently align so that one is either male or
female; however, for intersex persons, determining sex on these
indicators is decidedly less clear-cut.41
Although by no means exhaustive, the following are common
forms of intersexuality:
1. Klinefelter Syndrome: Men with Klinefelter syndrome
have an extra sex chromosome, such that their chromosal
makeups are XXY, instead of the typical XY. “The
syndrome is characterized by hypogonadism (small testes,
azoospermia, oligospermia), gynecomastia in late
puberty, psychosocial problems, hyalinization and
37

Id.
Olsen-Acre, supra note 28.
39
See supra note 28.
40
Cooper, supra note 18, at 238; see also Buzuvis, supra note 10, at
37–38 (“Sex cannot be distilled to a single, determinable factor. Many
biological and social factors—including chromosomes, hormones, genitals,
gender identity and gender expression—contribute to our interpretation of
whether an individual is male or female.”)
41
Cooper, supra note 18, at 238.
38
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fibrosis of the seminiferous tubules, and elevated urinary
gonadotropin levels.”42
2. Turner Syndrome: Individuals with this condition have
one X chromosome but are missing one sex chromosome.
Their genitalia, though female, is underdeveloped.43
3. Swyer Syndrome: This condition is also known as pure
gonadal dysgenesis. These individuals have an XY
chromosomal makeup typical of males; however, they
have a female genital appearance.44
4. Persistent Mullerian Duct Syndrome: This is a “rare
form of male pseudo-hermaphroditism characterized by
the presence of Mullerian duct structures in an otherwise
phenotypically, as well as genotypically, normal man.”45
5. Hermaphroditism: True hermaphrodites typically have
ambiguous external genitalia.46
6. Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome (“AIS”): This is the
most common form of male pseudohermaphroditism and
is also known as testicular feminization. Though
individuals with AIS are chromosomally and gonadally
male, they lack an androgen receptor necessary to
interact with the production of androgens, or male
hormones.47
7. 5-Alpha Reductase Deficiency: This condition is a
form of male pseudohermaphroditism in which an
individual appears to be externally female when young

42

Harold Chen, Klinefelter Syndrome, MEDSCAPE REFERENCE,
http://emedicine.medscape.com/article/945649-overview (last updated July
26, 2011).
43
PREVES, supra note 20, at 30.
44
Yang Han et al., Dysgerminoma in a Case of 46, XY Pure Gonadal
Dysgenesis (Swyer Sydrome): A Case Report, 6 DIAGNOSTIC PATHOLOGY 84
(2011).
45
Nishikant N. Gujar et al., Male Form of Persistent Mullerian Duct
Syndrome Type I (Hernia Uteri Inguinalis) Presenting as an Obstructed
Inguinal Hernia: A Case Report, 5 J. MED. CASE REP. 586 (2011); see also
Adair, supra note 18, at 126–27.
46
PREVES, supra note 20.
47
Id. at 27–28.
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but after puberty becomes more male in appearance.48
8. Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia: This condition is a
form of female pseudohermaphroditism whereby an
individual’s external organs develop in a typical male
fashion yet the individual’s internal organs develop like a
female.49
While there are a variety of ways in which one can be
intersexed, intersexed individuals do not necessarily consider
themselves to be intersexual but often view themselves as either
men or women.50 Within the realm of sports, Alice Dreger51
notes that “[i]n practice, athletes show up with genders—as men
or as women—and sex becomes an issue only if . . . an athlete
competing as a woman is suspected of being ‘really’
male . . . .”52 Here, Dreger references the tradition of sex
testing in the Olympics and the IOC’s standing to evaluate those
“suspected” of being a sex distinct from the one he/she
represents himself/herself to be.53 Through sex testing, the IOC
thus can challenge an individual’s understanding of his or her
sex.54 Given the IOC’s power to interfere with both how an
individual perceives himself or herself, as well as an individual’s
ability to compete in the Olympics, it is therefore critical that
the IOC promulgates unbiased policies towards intersexed
individuals.

48

Id. at 40.
Id. at 27.
50
Peterson, supra note 8, at 319.
51
Alice Dreger is a Professor of Clinical Medical Humanities and
Bioethics at the Feinberg School of Medicine at Northwestern University.
About Me, ALICE DOMURAT DREGER, http://www.alicedreger.com/about.
html (last visited Feb. 17, 2012).
52
Dreger, supra note 18, at 22.
53
Id.
54
See id.
49
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II. THE OLYMPIC MOVEMENT: STRUCTURE AND SEX TESTING
POLICIES
A. Organization of the Olympics
The Olympic Movement is comprised of the IOC,
International Federations, and National Olympic Committees.55
Within the IOC, there is a consultative Congress; a Session that
issues final decisions; the EB, which oversees the ongoings of
the IOC; and a President, who makes decisions when there is
disagreement in the Session.56 The Olympic Charter outlines
various duties of the IOC, most notably calling upon the
organization to “act against any form of discrimination affecting
the Olympic Movement; [t]o encourage and support the
promotion of women in sport at all levels and in all structures
with a view to implementing the principle of equality of men
and women . . . [and] [t]o encourage and support the
development of sport for all.”57
Functionally, the IOC coordinates the efforts of National
Olympic Committees (“NOCs”), International Sports
Federations58 (“IFs”), Organising Committees for the
Olympics Games (“OCOGs”), and athletes.59 In overseeing
IFs, the IOC recognizes their ability to administer specific
sports around the world.60 Additionally, IFs oversee
developments and organize competitions in specific sports.61
55

Cooper, supra note 18, at 245.
Id.
57
The IOC: The Organisation, supra note 1.
58
The IAAF, which worked with the IOC to develop a policy on
hyperandrogenic women in Olympic competitions, is an IF. International
Sports Federations, OLYMPIC.ORG, http://www.olympic.org/content/TheIOC/Governance/International-Federations/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2012);
International Association of Athletics Federations, OLYMPIC.ORG,
http://www.olympic.org/iaaf-athletics-road (last visited Feb. 17, 2012); IOC
Addresses Eligibility of Female Athletes with Hyperandrogenism, supra note
3.
59
The IOC: The Organisation, supra note 1.
60
International Sports Federations, supra note 58.
61
Id.
56
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IOC policies assist IFs in the governance of their respective
sports.62
Notably, the IOC has a distinct legal process for handling
disputes that arise in connection with athletes at the Olympic
Games.63 The IOC’s Olympic Charter mandates that parties
arbitrate any dispute arising from the Olympic Games in
accordance with the Code of Sports-Related Arbitration.”64 In
1984, the IOC established the Court of Arbitration for Sport
(“CAS”) and funded it to ensure that typical expenses associated
with litigating in court would not burden athletes and other
litigants.65 In this way, the IOC assures there is a forum for
“increased disputes in international sports . . . .”66
B. Historical Overview of Sex Testing
Both the IAAF, the IF that regulates track and field events,
and the IOC, which oversees IFs like the IAAF, have a
substantial history of monitoring the sex of athletes at worldwide
athletics events and the Olympics.67 In its original form, sex
62

See IAAF MED. & ANTI-DOPING COMM’N, IAAF POLICY ON GENDER
VERIFICATION (2006), available at http://www.iaaf.org/mm/document/
imported/36983.pdf.
63
Cooper, supra note 18, at 245.
Although the IOC is an international, nongovernmental, not-forprofit organization without the power to make law as such, it
operates as part of an expansive and intricate network of regulatory
bodies that make decision that very much affect athletes’ lives, as
well as public perceptions of sport. IOC regulations have the force
of law within the Games themselves. Within the Olympic Games,
IOC decisions are final and can be appealed only to the IOC
Executive Board or in some cases to the Court of Arbitration for
Sport (CAS).
Olsen-Acre, supra note 28, at 210.
64
Int’l Olympic Comm. [IOC], Olympic Charter, r. 59, para. 1, at 104
(Feb. 11, 2010), available at http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Olympic
%20Charter/Charter_en_2010.pdf.
65
Cooper, supra note 18, at 245–46.
66
Id. at 246.
67
Ross Tucker & Malcolm Collins, The Science and Management of Sex
Verification in Sport, 21 S. AFRICAN J. SPORTS MED. 147, 150 (2009).
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testing was aimed at ensuring that men did not disguise
themselves and compete in women’s events to gain a competitive
advantage.68 Despite this purported interest in maintaining a
strict divide between men’s and women’s competitions, sex
testing has never uncovered a case of an athlete disguising his or
her sex.69 On the other hand, such testing has exposed female
athletes with various forms of sex disorders often previously
unknown to the competitors themselves.70
The 1936 Olympics in Berlin marks the first instance of
gender controversy in the Games.71 Stella Walsh and Helen
Stephens, two female sprinters from the United States, were
suspected of being men because of their masculine
appearances.72 Walsh was even given the nickname “Stella the
Fella” by the press.73 Following the 100-meter sprint, where
Stephens beat Walsh by 0.2 seconds, Walsh accused Stephens of
being a man.74 Upon Walsh’s death in 1980, it was revealed via
an autopsy that Walsh had atypical sex chromosomes and
ambiguous genitalia.75 Additionally, the 1936 Olympics marks
the only known instance of a male masquerading as a female for
competitive purposes.76 Hermann Ratjen, an Olympic high
jumper, bound his genitals in order to participate in the women’s
competition.77 Interestingly, Ratjen placed fourth behind three
women.78
The purported impetus behind the introduction of formal sex
testing in international athletic organizations was the string of
68

Adair, supra note 18, at 132 (“Predicated on the belief that men and
women should compete separately, administrators of athletic competitions
historically sought to prevent people from infiltrating the other sex’s division
in order to gain a competitive advantage.”).
69
Ritchie et al., supra note 2, at 398.
70
Id.
71
Peterson, supra note 8, at 320.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Olsen-Acre, supra note 28, at 212.
77
Id.
78
Id.
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eight other female competitors between 1932 and 1968 who
were accused of being men.79 In 1966, the IAAF required all
female participants at the European Track and Field
Championships to pass a “femininity” test to be eligible for
competition.80 The test consisted of a physical inspection of an
athlete’s genitalia.81 In 1967, however, the IAAF introduced a
new form of sex testing—the chromatin analysis.82 The
chromatin method involves a “buccal smear,” or a cheek swab,
taken from athletes to test for the presence of the Barr body,
which is found only in females.83 In light of the IAAF’s
developments, in 1968 the IOC instituted the chromatin testing
at the Mexico City Summer Olympic Games.84 The IOC
reasoned that such testing was less invasive than physical
inspections; nevertheless, the use of chromosomes to determine
sex is still flawed given the numerous chromosome combinations
discussed in Part I Section B of this Note.85
Ewa Klobukowska, an Olympian and co-world record holder
for the 100-meter sprint, was the first athlete disqualified as a
result of sex testing.86 In 1967, Klobukowska failed her
chromatin analysis at the European Cup Track and Field events
in Kiev and consequently was permanently disqualified from
future events and stripped of her records.87 The IOC even went
so far as to rescind her medals from the 1960 Olympics.88
Klobukowska not only suffered embarrassment within the IAAF
but also endured derision from the popular media.89 After
79

Peterson, supra note 8, at 320.
Id.
81
Id. at 321.
82
Id.
83
Ritchie et al., supra note 2, at 397.
84
Peterson, supra note 8, at 321.
85
Id.
86
Cheryl L. Cole, One Chromosome Too Many?, in THE OLYMPICS AT
THE MILLENNIUM: POWER, POLITICS, AND THE GAMES 128, 129 (Kay
Schaffer & Sidonie Smith eds., 2000). It is thought that Klobukowska had
XX/XXY mosaicism. Ritchie et al., supra note 2, at 397.
87
Peterson, supra note 8, at 322.
88
Id.
89
Id.
80
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Klobukowska was essentially turned into a public spectacle
following the sex test failure, the IOC and IAAF recommended
that athletes similarly situated should withdraw from
competitions, citing a warm-up injury, to avoid the media
frenzy.90
In 1992, yet another form of sex testing was introduced at
the Albertville Winter Olympics—the test involved a
“polymerase chain reaction (PCR) determination of the absence
or presence of DNA sequences from the testes-determining gene
located on the Y chromosome.”91 This test, however, was flawed
since at least one of the DNA sequences used in the PCR was
not restricted to males.92 Moreover, both the buccal smear test
and the PCR test are inadequate because they “do not consider
hormonal levels, physical appearance . . . or any other of the
many factors that can be said to contribute to a person’s
sex . . . .”93
The 1996 Atlanta Games evidenced a shift in the IOC’s
policy on the participation of intersex athletes.94 Though the IOC
tested over 3,000 women at the Atlanta Games and eight women
failed the test, it did not disqualify nor require the withdrawal of
any athletes from competition.95 Some scholars have speculated
that the case of Maria Jose Martinez Patino, a Spanish hurdler,
changed the IOC’s outlook towards intersex athletes.96 After
Patino was ruled ineligible to compete at the 1985 University
Games in Japan,97 she was diagnosed with AIS.98 Though the
90

Id.
JC Reeser, Gender Identity and Sport: Is the Playing Field Level?, 39
BRIT. J. SPORTS MED. 695, 696 (2005).
92
Id.
93
Olsen-Acre, supra note 28, at 217 (“Because the buccal smear and
polymerase chain reaction tests identify only chromosomal sex, they can
declare athletes to be a sex that the athletes themselves have never identified
as.”).
94
Peterson, supra note 8, at 322.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Michael D. Lemonick, Genetic Tests Under Fire, TIME (Feb. 24,
1992), http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,974937,00.html.
98
Cole, supra note 86, at 138. See supra Part I.B. for a further
91
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Spanish Athletic Federation removed her name from record
books, Patino vigilantly fought to reassume her status as a
woman in athletics.99 “Armed with the knowledge that because
of her androgen insensitivity she was unable to respond to
testosterone and was ‘unquestionably female and chromosomally
XY,’ Patino managed to be reinstated by the IAAF.”100 In 1991,
the IAAF discontinued its use of the chromatin analysis,101
returning to an earlier method where doctors observed athletes’
genitals during a routine physical examination.102 The IOC,
however, continued to utilize chromosome testing until 1999.103
Though the IOC moved away from compulsory sex testing,104
to this day it retains the right to test athletes on an individual
basis who are suspected of being a biological sex that differs
from his or her gender.105 After the 2006 Asia Games, Santhi
Soundarajan, an Indian runner, was stripped of her silver medal
for failing her sex test.106 Following the sex test, Soundarajan
was diagnosed with AIS.107 Rumors soon circulated that
Soundarajan attempted to commit suicide after discovering the
results of the sex test.108 No longer a competitor herself,
Soundarajan now coaches hopeful athletes at a sports academy
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99
Peterson, supra note 8, at 323.
100
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for underprivileged children.109 Soundarajan continues to
consider herself a woman; in fact, her birth certificate indicates
that she is female.110 Soundarajan’s painful and public experience
further highlights the problematic nature of the use of sex testing
in determining eligibility for competition, particularly for
intersex individuals.
The most recent controversy over an athlete’s sex is the case
of Caster Semenya.111 In 2009, at the Track and Field World
Championship, Caster Semenya, a South African athlete, beat
the defending world champion in the 800-meter competition by
2.45 seconds.112 Rumors that Semenya was not, in fact, a woman
quickly eclipsed the excitement surrounding her impressive
performance.113 Semenya’s fellow competitors openly doubted
her eligibility for women’s competitions given her masculine
appearance and record-shattering performance.114 In response to
public rumblings over Semenya’s questionable womanhood, the
IAAF asked that Semenya submit to sex testing to confirm her
eligibility for competition in the women’s division.115 The results
from Semenya’s sex test were never publicly released,116 in
109
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Champion Semenya, SI.COM (Aug. 21, 2009), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.
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keeping with the IAAF’s policy on privacy rights of athletes.117
While Semenya was permitted to keep her prize money, gold
medal, and World Champion title, her ability to compete in
future events in the women’s division remained uncertain.118
Moreover, Semenya herself struggled to recover from harsh
public skepticism about her sex, and she reportedly went “into
hiding due to the distress and embarrassment generated by the
controversy.”119 Semenya’s story illustrates the delicate balance
the IOC must strike in achieving fairness in the Games as well
as the serious consequences sex testing practices may have on
the reputations and livelihoods of individual athletes.
C. Current Sex Verification Policy
While the IOC has yet to release a finalized policy that will
dictate the eligibility of intersexual athletes for the 2012
Olympic Games in London, in April of 2011 it did release a
series of principles that will likely dictate the formulation of
such a policy.120 The principles are guided in large part by the
conclusions of two different conferences convened in 2010.121
The January 2010 meeting, organized by both the IOC Medical
Commission and the IAAF, sought to address the scientific
implications of female athletes with hyperandrogenism
competing on the Olympic level.122 The meeting was arguably
117
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prompted by the controversy over Semenya’s sex at the 2009
World Championships in Berlin.123 Following Semenya’s stellar
performance, some athletes questioned the fairness of her ability
to compete as a woman in light of her masculine features.124
While conference members generally agreed that they should
promulgate specific rules addressing female athletes with
hyperandrogenism, they gave no indication that they had decided
the substance of those rules.125 They did, however, reach two
general conclusions: (1) “in order to protect the health of the
athlete, sports authorities should have the responsibility to make
sure that any case of female hyperandrogenism that arises under
their jurisdiction receives adequate medical follow-up” and (2)
“rules need to be put in place to regulate the participation of
athletes with hyperandrogenism in competitions for women.”126
Furthering this concern for athlete health, conference members
advised that the IOC create “medical ‘centers of
excellence’ . . . to diagnose sex-development disorders.”127 The
IOC Medical Commission Chairman Arne Ljungqvist justified
the creation of such centers on the grounds that not every
country with Olympic athletes would have the requisite
resources to identify and treat intersex athletes.128 Constructing
“strategically located centers” would allow athletes to be tested
by qualified experts in an efficient and expedient manner,
Ljungqvist explained.129 Another idea discussed at the conference
involved requiring all athletes to undergo a medical examination
prior to competition.130
123
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The IOC Medical Commission organized a second
conference in October 2010 to further discuss the treatment of
athletes with hyperandrogenism.131 The conference consisted of
scientists, sports administrators, sports lawyers, human rights
experts, female athletes, experts in medical and sports ethics,
and a representative from Organisation Intersex International.132
The conference further emphasized the need for clear-cut rules
that would “respect the essence of the male/female classification
and also guarantee the fairness and integrity of female
competitions for all female athletes.”133
Drawing upon the conclusions reached by these two panels,
the IOC Medical Commission recommended a set of principles
to assist in the development of rules governing the participation
of intersex athletes.134 The principles are as follows:
(1) A female recognised in law should be eligible to
compete in female competitions provided that she has
androgen levels below the male range (as shown by the
serum concentration of testosterone) or, if within the
male range, she has androgen resistance such that she
derives no competitive advantage from such levels.
(2) An evaluation with respect to eligibility should be made
on an anonymous basis by a panel of independent
international experts in the field of hyperandrogenism that
would in each case issue a recommendation on eligibility for
the sport concerned. In each case, the sport would decide on
an athlete’s eligibility taking into consideration the panel’s
recommendation. Should an athlete be considered ineligible
to compete, she would be notified of the reasons why, and
informed of the conditions she would be required to meet
should she wish to become eligible again.

131
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(3) If an athlete refuses to comply with any aspect of the
eligibility determination process, while that is her right as
an individual, she will not be eligible to participate as a
competitor in the chosen sport.
(4) The investigation of a particular case should be
conducted under strict confidentiality. Although rare,
some women develop male-like body characteristics due
to an overproduction of male sex hormones, so-called
“androgens.” The androgenic effects on the human body
explain why men perform better than women in most
sports and are, in fact, the very reason for the distinction
between male and female in competition in most sports.
Consequently, women with hyperandrogenism generally
perform better in sport than other women.135
Ljungqvist noted that an athlete would only be investigated if
she herself sought out medical officials for an evaluation, if she
displayed male characteristics during drug testing, or if she had
abnormal hormone levels.136 At the same time, Ljungqvist
stressed that an athlete would not be subject to testing due to
accusations of other athletes that the individual was not a
woman.137
Once the rules are finalized, the EB of the IOC noted that it
would encourage IFs to adopt similar rules for use in their
competitions, “duly adapted to meet the specificities of the sport
concerned.”138 In April 2011, the IAAF adopted rules that
closely mirror the principles outlined by the IOC Medical
Commission, becoming the first international sports federation to
do so.139 The rules were approved by the IAAF at its meeting in
Daegu, South Korea—the host of the 2011 world
140
championships—and went into effect May 1, 2011.
135
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III. MARTIN AND SAGEN: THE LEGACY OF SEX DISCRIMINATION
LAWSUITS AGAINST OLYMPIC POLICIES
If formally adopted by the IOC prior to the 2012 Summer
Olympics in London, this policy on hyperandrogenism will
likely preclude some female athletes from participation. Female
athletes with androgen levels within the “male range” whose
bodies do not have an androgen resistance will be considered
ineligible for competition in women’s events.141 Such a policy is
discriminatory on its face because it is silent on the issue of
what constitutes an acceptable level of androgen for men
competing in men’s events.142 For instance, the intersex
condition Diplo (XYY) causes men to produce higher levels of
testosterone than other men, yet the IOC policy does not
disqualify men with Diplo from competitions.143
Recognizing this inequity, female competitors must find
appropriate methods to challenge this biased policy, such as
using litigation to attack the discrimination. This Part discusses
two lawsuits that female athletes have brought against the IOC,
and/or relevant organizing committees in host countries, alleging
sex discrimination in the administration of the Games; namely,
Martin v. International Olympics Committee and Sagen v.
Vancouver Organizing Committee for the 2010 Olympic and
Paralympic Winter Games.144 Though the groups of women in
both cases were ultimately unsuccessful in their suits, those
141
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cases are distinguishable from a hypothetical case challenging
the latest intersex policy. The cases provide important insight
into how women can assert successful claims that the
hyperandrogenism policy is discriminatory on the basis of sex.
A. Martin v. International Olympics Committee
In Martin v. International Olympics Committee, women
runners argued that a decision, and the rule used to implement
it, was discriminatory. Martin illustrates the potential pitfalls
female plaintiffs may encounter when they bring a sex
discrimination claim against various Olympics bodies in U.S.
courts. In particular, if the challenged rule is deemed genderneutral, the claim is less likely to succeed.
On August 15, 1983, a group of women runners filed a
complaint145 against the IOC, United States Olympic Committee
(“USOC”), Athletic Congress of the United States (“TAC”) and
Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee (“LAOOC”)
alleging that the defendants discriminated in the administration
of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games by failing to include
the 5,000 meter and 10,000 meter women’s track races.146 The
plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief and requested a
writ of mandate from the court directing the defendants to
institute women’s 5,000 meter and 10,000 meter track races.147
The plaintiffs argued, inter alia, that the defendants had violated
their right to the equal protection of law under the Fifth148 and
145

Though the complaint was originally filed by the plaintiffs in Los
Angeles Superior Court, it was later removed by the defendants to the United
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Fourteenth149 Amendments to the United States (“U.S.”)
Constitution.150
The court ultimately determined that the plaintiffs failed to
show a fair chance of success on the merits regarding their
federal constitutional claims.151 Though the plaintiffs argued that
the court should apply the test for sex discrimination utilized by
the United States Supreme Court in Craig v. Boren—
classifications based on gender “must serve important
governmental objectives” and be “substantially related” to those
objectives152—the court declined to apply that test because it
found that Rule 32 was gender-neutral.153 Rule 32 of the 1970
Olympic Charter governs the addition of events to the Olympic
Program.154 Under the rule, “a men’s sport may be added to the
Olympic Program if it is widely practiced in at least forty
from invidiously discriminating between groups or individuals.” Martin, 1984
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24941, at *22 (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954)).
149
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have engaged in state action. Martin, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24941, at *24.
The court relied upon a state action test announced in Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority, noting that the LAOOC was in a “position of
interdependence” with the state of California. Id. (citing Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961)).
150
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countries on three continents,” for the Summer Olympics, “and
at least twenty-five countries on two continents” for the Winter
Olympics.155 For women’s events, the sport must be “widely
practiced in twenty-five countries and two continents” for the
Summer Olympics and “twenty countries and two continents”
for the Winter Olympics.156
The plaintiffs then argued that the rule had a disproportionate
impact on women; however, the court noted that a
“disproportionate impact must be traceable to an invidiously
discriminatory purpose.”157 The court found no invidiously
discriminatory purpose behind Rule 32 because, statistically, the
number of female competitors in the Games has almost tripled
since 1948;158 forty-eight women’s events have been added to the
Games since 1949;159 “no new opportunities intended only for
male competitors have been added as exceptions to normal rules
and procedures”;160 and the plaintiffs produced no “statements
made by persons involved in the decision,” which would
illustrate a discriminatory purpose.161 Thus, the court rejected the
plaintiffs’ contention that the rule was discriminatory on the
basis of gender.162
155
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After the district court denied the plaintiffs’ requested
injunctive relief, the plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.163 The Ninth Circuit noted that
though “the women runners made a strong showing that the
early history of the modern Olympic Games was marred by
blatant discrimination against women . . . women’s participation
in the Olympics had increased markedly during the past thirtysix years.”164 The plaintiffs challenged the decision of the district
judge on several grounds; specifically, they argued that the
district judge had incorrectly concluded that Rule 32 was facially
gender-neutral165 and that the district judge should have shifted
the burden of proof to the defendants after they presented ample
evidence of historical discrimination in the Olympic Games.166
Addressing these arguments in turn, the Ninth Circuit rejected
the plaintiffs’ argument that the Rule was not facially neutral
because “[R]ule 32 undeniably applies to both men and women
athletes as it established criteria for adding all new events to the
Olympic program.”167 In response to the plaintiffs’ second
argument, the Ninth Circuit noted that a historical background
of discrimination in the Olympics “is insufficient alone to create
a presumption of purposeful discrimination or to shift the burden
of showing discriminatory intent behind this facially neutral
regulation.”168 Thus, under its “very limited” scope of review,169
the court found that the district judge had applied a proper legal
analysis and affirmed the decision.170 Acknowledging its
restricted ability to review the district court’s decision, the Ninth
Circuit noted that its review on appeal “may provide little
guidance as to the appropriate disposition [of the case] on the
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merits.”171 This disclaimer evidences the possibility for a
different outcome had the Ninth Circuit possessed a broader
scope of review.
B. Sagen v. Vancouver Organizing Committee for the 2010
Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games
Years after the plaintiffs in Martin charged that the absence
of the women’s 5,000 meter and 10,000 meter track event was
discriminatory, in 2008 a group of female ski jumpers brought
suit in the Supreme Court of British Columbia, making similar
claims about the exclusion of women’s ski jumping from the
Olympic Program.172 Sagen evidences the difficulty with naming
defendants in gender discrimination suits concerning the
Olympics. Courts are wary of applying national law to
international organizations yet are reticent to hold national
committees entirely responsible for the implementation of
policies guided by those international organizations. The women
here claimed that the Vancouver Organizing Committee for the
2010 Olympic and Paralympic Games (“VANOC”) had violated
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.173 They argued
that VANOC’s decision to hold men’s ski jumping events and
not women’s ski jumping events violated Section 15(1) of the
Canadian Charter,174 which prohibits discrimination on the basis
of sex and other protected classes.175
In analyzing the claim of the female ski jumpers, the court
outlined three issues: (1) does the Canadian Charter apply to
VANOC, (2) if so, did VANOC breach Section 15 by failing to
host women’s ski jumping, and (3) is an infringement under
171
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Section 15 negated by Section 1 of the Canadian Charter?176 In
response to the first issue, the court found that, though VANOC
is a “private entity,”177 the Canadian Charter applied to VANOC
because it engaged in a “government activity”178 by “planning,
organizing, financing, and staging the 2010 Games.”179
In addressing the second issue, the court utilized a two-part
test to ascertain whether there was discrimination under § 15(1)
of the Canadian Charter: “(1) Does the law create a distinction
based on an enumerated or analogous ground? (2) Does the
distinction create a disadvantage by perpetuating prejudice or
stereotyping?”180 Interestingly, the court looked to Martin to
evaluate sex discrimination.181 The court critiqued the Martin
court’s determination that Rule 32 was gender-neutral, noting
that
[t]he majority in Martin did not go beyond formal
distinctions
to
consider
adverse
effects
[of]
discrimination, in particular, whether the application of
rules neutral on their face result in the unequal treatment
of women who compete in events that are already
included in the Olympics for men but not for women.182
Thus, the court rejected Martin’s narrower outlook on sex
discrimination and found, using its two-pronged test, that (1) the
female ski jumpers were being “treated less favourably” as
compared to male ski jumpers183 and (2) “the Olympic Charter
Rules that grandfather men’s ski jumping, while requiring
women’s ski jumping events to meet the criteria for inclusion of
new events” was discriminatory.184
Despite its finding of discrimination, the court noted that the
plaintiffs’ suit was not brought against the IOC, who
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
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promulgated the rules, but rather brought against VANOC, the
organization that implemented the rules.185 The court explained
that the IOC was not a party to the suit because it was not
subject to the Canadian Charter as a Swiss organization.186
Though the plaintiffs attempted to argue that VANOC’s
implementation of IOC policy was discriminatory, the court
noted that VANOC had no authority to select which events
would be staged at the Olympics.187 Rather, the IOC and IFs
have authority over Olympic events.188 Ultimately, the court
found that since “VANOC did not make the decision to exclude
women’s ski jumping from the 2010 Games[,]” VANOC did not
violate the Canadian Charter.189
IV. HYPOTHETICAL SEX DISCRIMINATION SUIT CHALLENGING
INTERSEX POLICY
Though the plaintiffs in both Martin and Sagen were
ultimately unsuccessful in their lawsuits charging discriminatory
practices at the Olympics, both cases could inform the
formulation of a potential lawsuit brought by female athletes
challenging the IOC and IAAF policy on hyperandrogenism.
Even though the cases are from different countries, the
Honourable Madam Justice Fenlon’s analysis in Sagen engages
with the Martin court’s reasoning, which evidences a willingness
185
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of courts to look beyond their jurisdictions when evaluating sex
discrimination claims against an international player such as the
IOC.190 More broadly, U.S., Canadian, and British law “fall
within the scope of a single, common legal tradition”
characterized by legal borrowing.191 “Legal borrowing” implies a
willingness among these countries to, explicitly or implicitly,
share jurisprudence.192 While Vincent-Joël Proulx analyzes “legal
borrowing” within the framework of trademark law, the concept
has the potential for other applications, particularly when the
body of law is susceptible to an international exchange and
involves international players.193
This section outlines the structure of a potential lawsuit and
assesses its likelihood of success. After first addressing the
proper venue and parties for such a case, this section then turns
to the claim itself and considers what an argument of sex
discrimination should look like. Ultimately, this Note concludes
that a sex discrimination suit against the IOC/IAAF
hyperandrogenism policy would be more successful than either
Martin or Sagen because of the ability to hold the London
Organising Committee of the Olympic Games (“LOCOG”)
directly responsible for supporting a facially discriminatory
policy.
A. Where: British Law on Sex Discrimination
Assuming arguendo that the IOC were to finalize its policy
on hyperandrogenism prior to the 2012 Summer Olympics in
London—which is likely, as it was adopted by the IAAF194—a
195
sex discrimination suit would necessarily be brought in Britain.
190
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Recall that in Martin, the plaintiffs brought suit in state court in
California,196 charging that the absence of certain women’s
events at the Los Angeles Olympics was discriminatory.197 Later,
the plaintiffs in Sagen litigated their claim concerning the
Vancouver Olympics in the Supreme Court of British
Columbia.198 Additionally, the Court of Arbitration for Sport
would not have jurisdiction over this suit because there is not a
“specific agreement” between the female athletes and the
London Organising Committee of the Olympic Games.199 Despite
the outcomes of both Martin and Sagen, plaintiffs seeking to
challenge the implementation of the intersex policy at the
London Games would be advised to bring suit in England, the
country in which the Games will be staged, to ensure proper
venue over the LOCOG.
A claim against various Olympic entities in Britain would
most likely be brought under that country’s new Equality Act,
passed in 2010.200 The law was aimed at synthesizing nine major
pieces legislation201 into a single, cohesive “legal framework”
guaranteeing equality.202 Despite the unification under the
Related Disputes, art. A, § 1 (Jan. 1, 2012), available at http://www.tascas.org/d2wfiles/document/4962/5048/0/Code20201220_en_2001.01.pdf.
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Equality Act, the relevant sex discrimination law is still
contained within the text of the Sex Discrimination Act (“SDA”)
of 1975.203 The SDA prohibits both direct and indirect204
discrimination on the basis of sex in the realm of “goods,
facilities and services.”205 Notably, there is an exception for
sports, as the SDA permits separation of the sexes within sports
“where the physical strength, stamina or physique of the average
woman puts her at a disadvantage to the average man . . . .”206
Moreover, the Equality Act states that “[s]ex discrimination is
lawful in certain circumstances when selecting participants for
sports and other events of a competitive nature where activities
are confined to competitors of one sex.”207 The language of the
SDA, and other laws encompassed within the Equality Act,
suggests that British law tolerates separate events for different
sexes based on physical differences between men and women;
however, a lawsuit challenging the IOC and IAAF policy on
hyperandrogenism would not object to the existence of separate
men’s and women’s divisions in Olympic competition, but rather
how the Olympic bodies would regulate who counts as a woman.
Simply, the discrimination here is the arbitrary definition of
woman and the consequences of excluding from competition
athletes who consider themselves women.
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B. Who: Determining Defendants in a Sex Discrimination
Suit
Once deciding where to litigate their claim, hypothetical
plaintiffs would then identify the relevant defendants. Recall that
in Martin, the plaintiffs sued the IOC in addition to U.S.
Olympic governing bodies.208 In Sagen, however, the plaintiffs
did not join the IOC as a defendant.209 Jennifer Anne Cleary, in
her Note A Need to Align the Modern Games with Modern
Times: the International Olympic Committee’s Commitment to
Fairness, Equality, and Sex Discrimination, suggests that the
plaintiffs in Sagen did not join the IOC because of the outcome
of Martin and “the history of deference to the IOC’s
decisions.”210 Admittedly, in both Martin and Sagen the courts
may have been reticent to demand that an international
organization alter the Olympic program.211
Respect for the IOC’s authority, on the other hand, did not
control the outcome of those cases. Although they joined the
IOC as defendants, the plaintiffs in Martin were unsuccessful
because the court found that Rule 32 was not discriminatory on
its face.212 The plaintiffs in Sagen lost because they did not bring
suit against the IOC, which was responsible for determining the
Olympic program.213 The Sagen plaintiffs, who brought their
claim in the Supreme Court of British Columbia, did not join the
IOC because it was not subject to the Canadian Charter.214 Thus,
the plaintiffs in Sagen were out of luck—they could not sue the
IOC because of lack of jurisdiction, but could not assert a
successful claim against VANOC because it did not control the
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Olympic program.215 The Honourable Madam Justice Fenlon,
however, left open the possibility that there exist “exceptions to
the general principle” that VANOC could not be held responsible
for the discriminatory policy because it did not create it.216
A sex discrimination suit against the hyperandrogenism
policy should fall within the exception noted by the Honourable
Madam Justice Fenlon. Just as the court in Sagen looked to
Martin to influence its decision, the hypothetical court here
should incorporate analyses from Sagen and Martin into its own
decision. Here, the plaintiffs’ success hinges on whether they
are able to show that the implementing entity—in this case
LOCOG—is so supportive of the discriminatory policy that it
should itself be held accountable for it. In Sagen, it was
important to the Honourable Madam Justice Fenlon’s decision
that VANOC had expressed its support for the female athletes;
she wrote that VANOC “remains ready and willing to host [a
women’s ski jumping] event should the IOC change its
decision.”217 It was difficult to hold VANOC responsible for
enforcing the IOC’s discriminatory decision when VANOC had
clearly demonstrated its backing of the female ski jumpers.218
Here, however, more support exists for the hyperandrogenism
policy than for the female athletes. Not only has the IAAF
adopted the policy219 but LOCOG has essentially ratified it by
recognizing that the final IOC policy on hyperandrogenism will
govern at the 2012 Olympic Games.220 As LOCOG supports the
IOC policy on hyperandrogenism, or at least does not outwardly
object to it as VANOC did in Sagen, the hypothetical plaintiffs
here would have a stronger case against LOCOG than the
plaintiffs in Sagen had against VANOC. Thus, the Sagen
dilemma of lack of jurisdiction over the IOC is avoided since the
local organizing committee itself can be named as a defendant.
215
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C. What: The Sex Discrimination Claim
The IOC and IAAF policy on hyperandrogenism is facially
discriminatory because the policy only regulates androgen levels
in women, not men.221 The principles put forth by the IOC
explicitly require “female[s]” in “female competitions” to have
“androgen levels below the male range,” but the policy is silent
on what the threshold for the male range is, or if there is an
androgen limit for males in male competitions.222 In this vein,
Hida Viloria, the Human Rights Spokesperson for the
Organisation Intersex International,223 argues that “many athletes
have conditions that give them physical advantages,
and . . . seeking to remove the advantages of only women with
hyperandrogenism is discriminatory.”224 Viloria cites to the
“intersex variation Diplo,” which causes men to produce higher
levels of testosterone, and points out, “no one is insisting that
[men with Diplo] lower their testosterone levels to the ‘normal’
male level.”225
Furthermore, the hyperandrogenism policy is overly
simplistic because it assumes there exists a “normal” level of
androgens in females.226 Dr. Eric Vilain, a professor of human
genetics, pediatrics and urology at the University of California
Los Angeles’ David Geffen School of Medicine and participant
221
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in the January 2010 IOC panel on hyperandrogenism, noted that
“there is a tremendous variation in hormone levels even in
typical females, which makes determining a baseline virtually
impossible.”227 Additionally, Alice Dreger argues that female
athletes are “likely to have naturally high levels of androgens.
That is probably part of why [they] succeed[] athletically.”228
Thus, the IOC’s hyperandrogenism policy is not only
discriminatory because it focuses solely on women, but it also
rests on flawed logic because it incorrectly assumes that science
is capable of quantifying a “normal” level of androgens in
women.
The IOC and IAAF policy unfairly targets women with
hyperandrogenism on the basis of maintaining a level playing
field for other female athletes;229 however, this rationale is
defective because it does not account for the failure of these
organizations to regulate other factors that affect athletes’
competitive advantages. For instance, Alice Dreger points out
that men tend to be taller than women; however, no sporting
body attempts to bar from competition women who are a “maletypical height . . . .”230 Indeed, “sports are inherently unequal
regardless of genetics . . . and any potential athletic advantages
one might have because of a DSD are no different from other
naturally occurring physical advantage like being taller or having
more balance.”231 Furthermore, it is unclear whether increased
androgens actually translate into a competitive advantage.232
227
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Clearly, the IOC and IAAF’s purported interest in maintaining a
level playing field through the strict separation of sexes fails to
justify the implementation of an arbitrary hyperandrogenism
policy that unfairly discriminates against women.
CONCLUSION
The IOC and IAAF policy on hyperandrogenism plainly
conflicts with the sentiment of equality of the sexes within the
Olympic Charter. While a sex discrimination suit against
LOCOG is not the only means to challenge the
hyperandrogenism policy, it represents an effective avenue for
addressing the inequity presented by the regulation of androgen
levels in women. Certainly, a lawsuit involving female athletes
and Olympic organizing bodies would draw international media
attention and highlight the unfair practice of sex testing. Female
athletes looking to dispute the policy’s implementation at the
Summer Olympic Games in London would likely have more
success than the plaintiffs in Martin and Sagen because of the
importance placed on sex equality in British law, the ability to
hold LOCOG responsible for the policy, and the recognition that
the policy represents outright discrimination against women.
The IOC and IAAF’s efforts to ensure a level playing field
in international sports competitions have effectively undercut
much of the progress made in the realm of women’s sports. By
insisting that female athletes possess androgen levels below the
“male” level, these organizations have oversimplified what it
means to be a woman. Furthermore, the imposition of an
artificial definition of woman upon athletes precludes from
competition certain athletes that have always considered
themselves to be female.

that those whose biological sex is difficult to ascertain have attributes
superior to the genetically female.” Larson, supra note 101, at 232.

